|
EconStor >
International Telecommunications Society (ITS) >
21st European Regional ITS Conference, Copenhagen 2010 >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44346
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Stühmeier, Torben | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-02-18T16:13:04Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-02-18T16:13:04Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44346 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Typically, incumbent providers enjoy a demand-side advantage over any entrant. However, market entrants may enjoy a supply-side advantage in costs over the incumbent, since they are more efficient or operate on innovative technologies, such as the voice of internet protocol (VoIP) telephony. Regulation with a supply-side asymmetry has rarely been addressed. Considering both a supply-side and a demand- side asymmetry, the present model analyzes the effects different regulation regimes. Regulation may have adverse effects on subscribers, market shares, and profits. If providers can discriminate between on-net and off-net prices, asymmetric regulation has no local effect on market shares, independent of any demand- and supply-side asymmetry. Otherwise, with reciprocal termination charges, price discrimination leads to qualitatively same effects than nondiscriminatory pricing. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | ITS Europe Berlin | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | 21st European Regional ITS Conference, Copenhagen 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L51 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L96 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Termination charges | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Interconnection | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Regulation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Price Discrimination | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Fixed to VoIP Interconnection: Regulation with Asymmetric Termination Costs | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Conference Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 654502390 | | - |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | 21st European Regional ITS Conference, Copenhagen 2010
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|