EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44234
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorRebitzer, James B.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTaylor, Lowell J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-04en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-11T14:30:48Z-
dc.date.available2011-02-11T14:30:48Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/44234-
dc.description.abstractEmployers structure pay and employment relationships to mitigate agency problems. A large literature in economics documents how the resolution of these problems shapes personnel policies and labor markets. For the most part, the study of agency in employment relationships relies on highly stylized assumptions regarding human motivation, e.g., that employees seek to earn as much money as possible with minimal effort. In this essay, we explore the consequences of introducing behavioral complexity and realism into models of agency within organizations. Specifically, we assess the insights gained by allowing employees to be guided by such motivations as the desire to compare favorably to others, the aspiration to contribute to intrinsically worthwhile goals, and the inclination to reciprocate generosity or exact retribution for perceived wrongs. More provocatively, from the standpoint of standard economics, we also consider the possibility that people are driven, in ways that may be opaque even to themselves, by the desire to earn social esteem or to shape and reinforce identity.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5058en_US
dc.subject.jelD2en_US
dc.subject.jelJ0en_US
dc.subject.jelM5en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordagencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordmotivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordemployment relationshipsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbehavioral economicsen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsverhältnisen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen_US
dc.subject.stwMotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleExtrinsic rewards and intrinsic motives: Standard and behavioral approaches to agency and labor marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn638483174en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
638483174.pdf497.91 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.