Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43838
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dc.contributor.authorDimitrov, Dinkoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:24:03Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:24:03Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-8232en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43838-
dc.description.abstractThe top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition property guarantees the existence of semistrictly core stable coalition structures. Moreover, for each game satisfying the common ranking property, the core and the semistrict core coincide.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW |cBielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics |x377en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCoalition formationen_US
dc.subject.keywordCommon ranking propertyen_US
dc.subject.keywordHedonic gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordSemistrict coreen_US
dc.subject.keywordTop coalition propertyen_US
dc.titleOn top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stabilityen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572499132en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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