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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43838
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| Title: | | On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability  |
| Authors: | | Dimitrov, Dinko |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 377 |
| Abstract: | | The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition property guarantees the existence of semistrictly core stable coalition structures. Moreover, for each game satisfying the common ranking property, the core and the semistrict core coincide. |
| Subjects: | | Coalition formation Common ranking property Hedonic games Semistrict core Top coalition property |
| JEL: | | D72 C71 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-8232 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld
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