Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43838
Authors: 
Dimitrov, Dinko
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 377
Abstract: 
The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition property guarantees the existence of semistrictly core stable coalition structures. Moreover, for each game satisfying the common ranking property, the core and the semistrict core coincide.
Subjects: 
Coalition formation
Common ranking property
Hedonic games
Semistrict core
Top coalition property
JEL: 
D72
C71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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