Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43822
Authors: 
Haake, Claus-Jochen
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 366
Abstract: 
We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equlibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed.
Subjects: 
support result
object division
market
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
JEL: 
C78
D40
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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