Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43817 
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dc.contributor.authorHerzberg, Frederiken
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-29-
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:23:42Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:23:42Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-14216en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43817-
dc.description.abstractThe relationship between propositional model theory and social decision making via premise-based procedures is explored. A one-to-one correspondence between ultrafilters on the population set and weakly universal, unanimity-respecting, systematic judgment aggregation functions is established. The proof constructs an ultraproduct of profiles, viewed as propositional structures, with respect to the ultrafilter of decisive coalitions. This representation theorem can be used to prove other properties of such judgment aggregation functions, in particular sovereignty and monotonicity, as well as an impossibility theorem for judgment aggregation in finite populations. As a corollary, Lauwers and Van Liedekerke's (1995) representation theorem for preference aggregation functions is derived.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefelden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x405en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordJudgment aggregation functionen
dc.subject.keywordUltraproducten
dc.subject.keywordUltrafilteren
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen
dc.subject.stwAggregationen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleJudgment aggregation functions and ultraproducts-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn595212468en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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