|
EconStor >
Universität Bielefeld >
Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Universität Bielefeld >
Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43812
|
| | |
| Title: | | On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules  |
| Authors: | | Haake, Claus-Jochen Trockel, Walter |
| Issue Date: | | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 393 |
| Abstract: | | Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome this shortcoming. We even show that such correspondences satisfy a stronger version of monotonicity that is even sufficient for Nash implementability. |
| Subjects: | | Maskin monotonicity Social choice rule Bargaining games Nash program Mechanism Implementation |
| JEL: | | C71 C78 D61 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-11274 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43812
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|