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Title:On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules PDF Logo
Authors:Haake, Claus-Jochen
Trockel, Walter
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 393
Abstract:Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome this shortcoming. We even show that such correspondences satisfy a stronger version of monotonicity that is even sufficient for Nash implementability.
Subjects:Maskin monotonicity
Social choice rule
Bargaining games
Nash program
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-11274
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University

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