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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43811
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| Title: | | Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games  |
| Authors: | | Shellshear, Evan |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 410 |
| Abstract: | | This paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certain correspondence. |
| Subjects: | | Cooperative game Core Stable set Fuzzy coalition Fuzzy game Core stability |
| JEL: | | C71 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-14254 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld
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