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dc.contributor.authorShellshear, Evanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:23:35Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:23:35Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-14254en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43811-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certain correspondence.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW Bielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 410en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCooperative gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordCoreen_US
dc.subject.keywordStable seten_US
dc.subject.keywordFuzzy coalitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordFuzzy gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordCore stabilityen_US
dc.subject.stwCoreen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwFuzzy Setsen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCharacterizing core stability with fuzzy gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn595211569en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld

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