Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43808
Authors: 
Haake, Claus-Jochen
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 359
Abstract: 
We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to implement bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential.
Subjects: 
Object Division
Market Procedure
Perles-Maschler Solution
JEL: 
C78
C62
D51
D63
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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