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dc.contributor.authorDimitrov, Dinkoen_US
dc.contributor.authorHaake, Claus-Jochenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:23:30Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:23:30Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-9850en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43807-
dc.description.abstractWe consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, dependent on conditions we impose on the solution concept. It turns out that a bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, is crucial. It generalizes a condition termed 'absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions' that was previously used to derive core existence results.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW Bielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 378en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCoalition formationen_US
dc.subject.keywordSemistrict coreen_US
dc.subject.keywordSimple gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordWinning coalitionsen_US
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwCoreen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleStable governments and the semistrict core. Revised version of 'Coalition formation in simple games: the semistrict core'en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572383568en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld

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