EconStor >
Universit├Ąt Bielefeld >
Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University >
Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title:Stable governments and the semistrict core. Revised version of 'Coalition formation in simple games: the semistrict core' PDF Logo
Authors:Dimitrov, Dinko
Haake, Claus-Jochen
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 378
Abstract:We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, dependent on conditions we impose on the solution concept. It turns out that a bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, is crucial. It generalizes a condition termed 'absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions' that was previously used to derive core existence results.
Subjects:Coalition formation
Semistrict core
Simple games
Winning coalitions
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-9850
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
572383568.pdf226.07 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.