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dc.contributor.authorBranzei, Rodicaen_US
dc.contributor.authorDimitrov, Dinkoen_US
dc.description.abstractWe provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. As it turns out, a cooperative game is convex if and only if all its marginal games are superadditive, and a monotonic game satisfying the veto player property with respect to the members of a coalition C is a total clan game (with clan C) if and only if all its C-based marginal games are subadditive.en_US
dc.publisherInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW Bielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 368en_US
dc.subject.keywordConvex gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordMarginal gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordSubadditive gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordSuperadditive gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordTotal clan gamesen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.titleConvex games, clan games, and their marginal gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University

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