Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43790
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dc.contributor.authorShellshear, Evanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:23:09Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:23:09Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-10773en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43790-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates conditions under which the core of a TU cooperative game is stable. In particular the author extends the idea of extendability to find new conditions under which the core is stable. It is also shown that these new conditions are not necessary for core stability.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW |cBielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics |x387en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCore stabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordStable coreen_US
dc.subject.keywordExtendabilityen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn core stability and extendabilityen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572384475en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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