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Title:On core stability and extendability PDF Logo
Authors:Shellshear, Evan
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 387
Abstract:This paper investigates conditions under which the core of a TU cooperative game is stable. In particular the author extends the idea of extendability to find new conditions under which the core is stable. It is also shown that these new conditions are not necessary for core stability.
Subjects:Core stability
Stable core
Extendability
JEL:C71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-10773
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld

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