Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43788 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers No. 321
Publisher: 
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Abstract: 
Game Theory describes human interaction involving conflict, cooperation and competition, the term Interpersonal Decision Theory is synonymous. The term reflects the fact that most essential features of this field are manifested in parlor games. This topic-level treatment covers large parts of the basic concepts and methods and sketches some fields of recent applications. The simultaneous occurrence of strategic, stochastic and dynamic phenomena, the fundamental role of epistemic aspects like knowledge and information and the impact of institutional and organizational structures make game theoretic analysis a highly complex task.
Subjects: 
allocation
apportionment
Aumann economy
axiomatic approach
balanced games
bargaining solution
characters
coalitional form
convex games
cooperative game
coordination game
core
cost sharing
directed games
equivalence principle
exchange economy
extensive form
evolutionary stability
fictitious play
game form
homogeneous games
implementation
incentive compatible
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
knowledge
LP-game, Maschler-Perles solution
mechanism
modiclus
Nash equilibrium
Nash solution
normal form
nucleolus
outcome function
payoff function
reduced games
repeated games
revelation principle
Shapley value
simple games
social choice rule
TU-game
vNM-Stable Set
voting games
Walrasian equilibrium
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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