Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43787 
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dc.contributor.authorHaake, Claus-Jochenen
dc.contributor.authorKlaus, Bettinaen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-29-
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:23:06Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:23:06Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13473en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43787-
dc.description.abstractWe consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a 'double stable' matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefelden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x399en
dc.subject.jelC62en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.jelJ41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMatching with couplesen
dc.subject.keyword(Maskin) monotonicityen
dc.subject.keywordNash implementationen
dc.subject.keywordStabilityen
dc.subject.keywordWeakly responsive preferencesen
dc.titleStability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn584638965en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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