Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43787
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dc.contributor.authorHaake, Claus-Jochenen_US
dc.contributor.authorKlaus, Bettinaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:23:06Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:23:06Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13473en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43787-
dc.description.abstractWe consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a 'double stable' matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW |cBielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics |x399en_US
dc.subject.jelC62en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMatching with couplesen_US
dc.subject.keyword(Maskin) monotonicityen_US
dc.subject.keywordNash implementationen_US
dc.subject.keywordStabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordWeakly responsive preferencesen_US
dc.titleStability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couplesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn584638965en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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