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Title:Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples PDF Logo
Authors:Haake, Claus-Jochen
Klaus, Bettina
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 399
Abstract:We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a 'double stable' matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.
Subjects:Matching with couples
(Maskin) monotonicity
Nash implementation
Stability
Weakly responsive preferences
JEL:C62
C78
D78
J41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13473
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University

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