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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43787
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| Title: | | Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples  |
| Authors: | | Haake, Claus-Jochen Klaus, Bettina |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 399 |
| Abstract: | | We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a 'double stable' matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable. |
| Subjects: | | Matching with couples (Maskin) monotonicity Nash implementation Stability Weakly responsive preferences |
| JEL: | | C62 C78 D78 J41 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13473 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld
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