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Title:An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution PDF Logo
Authors:Trockel, Walter
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 426
Abstract:This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S,d) an extensive form game G(S,d) is defined that has an infinity of weakly subgame perfect equilibria whose payoff vectors coincide with that of the sequential Raiffa solution of (S,d). Moreover all those equilibria share the same equilibrium path consisting of proposing the Raiffa solution and accepting it in the first stage of the game. By a modification of G(S,d) the analogous result is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation of a sequential Raiffa (solution based) social choice rule in subgame perfect equilibrium.
Subjects:Raiffa solution
Non-cooperative foundation
Nash program
Solution based social choice rule
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-16207
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University

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