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Title:A note on apportionment methods PDF Logo
Authors:Shellshear, Evan
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 391
Abstract:This paper investigates the suitability of apportionment methods based on the idea of preserving the coalition function of the simple game represented by the populations of the states. The results show that an apportionment method which satisfies desirable properties such as population monotonicity, house monotonicity, etc., does not exist. A classification of simple voting games via winning coalitions is also given.
Subjects:Apportionment methods
Simple games
Winning coalitions
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-10982
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University

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