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Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43785
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| Title: | | A note on apportionment methods  |
| Authors: | | Shellshear, Evan |
| Issue Date: | | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 391 |
| Abstract: | | This paper investigates the suitability of apportionment methods based on the idea of preserving the coalition function of the simple game represented by the populations of the states. The results show that an apportionment method which satisfies desirable properties such as population monotonicity, house monotonicity, etc., does not exist. A classification of simple voting games via winning coalitions is also given. |
| Subjects: | | Apportionment methods Simple games Winning coalitions |
| JEL: | | C71 D72 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-10982 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld
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