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dc.contributor.authorJäger, Gerharden_US
dc.contributor.authorKoch-Metzger, Larsen_US
dc.contributor.authorRiedel, Franken_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:22:55Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:22:55Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-15602en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43778-
dc.description.abstractWe study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of the strict Nash equilibria of this game by representing these categories by Voronoi languages. As the strategy set is infinite static stability concepts for finite games such as ESS are no longer sufficient for Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. We give examples of unstable strict Nash equilibria and stable inefficient Voronoi languages. We derive efficient Voronoi languages with a large number of categories and numerically illustrate stability of some Voronoi languages with large message spaces and non-uniformly distributed types.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW Bielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 420en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCheap talken_US
dc.subject.keywordSignaling gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordCommunication gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordDynamic stabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordVoronoi tesselationen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunikationen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleVoronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signalsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn61689936Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld

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