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dc.contributor.authorÇiftçi, Barışen_US
dc.contributor.authorDimitrov, Dinkoen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.en_US
dc.publisherInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW Bielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 384en_US
dc.subject.keywordBanzhaf valueen_US
dc.subject.keywordHedonic gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordShapley valueen_US
dc.subject.keywordSimple gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordStrict coreen_US
dc.titleStable coalition structures in simple games with veto controlen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University

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