Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43773
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dc.contributor.authorÇiftçi, Barışen_US
dc.contributor.authorDimitrov, Dinkoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:22:27Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:22:27Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-9969en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43773-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW |cBielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics |x384en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBanzhaf valueen_US
dc.subject.keywordHedonic gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordSemi-valueen_US
dc.subject.keywordShapley valueen_US
dc.subject.keywordSimple gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordStrict coreen_US
dc.titleStable coalition structures in simple games with veto controlen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572383118en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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