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dc.contributor.authorBranzei, Rodicaen_US
dc.contributor.authorDimitrov, Dinkoen_US
dc.contributor.authorTijs, Stefen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:22:26Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:22:26Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-9098en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43772-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. We show that a 'dualize and restrict' procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each monotonic convex game generates a total clan game with zero worth for the clan by a 'dualize and extend' procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of the Weber set of the corresponding games.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW Bielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 381en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordConvex gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordCore , Dual gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordMarginal gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordTotal clan gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordWeber seten_US
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwCoreen_US
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleConvex games versus clan gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572382111en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld

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