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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43771
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| Title: | | Evolutionary stability of first price auctions  |
| Authors: | | Louge, Fernando Riedel, Frank |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 435 |
| Abstract: | | This paper studies the evolutionary stability of the unique Nash equilibrium of a first price sealed bid auction. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium is not asymptotically stable under payoff monotonic dynamics for arbitrary initial popu- lations. In contrast, when the initial population includes a continuum of strategies around the equilibrium, the replicator dynamic does converge to the Nash equilibrium. Simulations are presented for the replicator and Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics. They suggest that the convergence for the replicator dynamic is slow compared to the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics. |
| Subjects: | | Auction theory Evolutionary stability |
| JEL: | | C73 D44 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-17291 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld
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