Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43768 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorTrockel, Walteren
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-26-
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:22:22Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:22:22Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-16196en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43768-
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides four axioms that uniquely characterize the sequential Raiffa solution proposed by Raiffa (1951, 1953) for two-person bargaining games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several popular bargaining solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on TU-bargaining games where they coincide. The fourth axiom is a weakening of Kalai's (1977) axiom of step-by-step negotiating and turns out to be sort of a dual condition to a weaker version of Nash's IIA-axiom that together with the three standard axioms suffices to characterize the Nash bargaining solution due to Nash (1950). A conclusion of this axiomatization is that in contrast to all other known bargaining solutions the sequential Raiffa solution does not represent just another kind of fairness or equity condition in addition to the three standard axioms but rather is determined by indefinite repeated application of the three standard axioms.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefelden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x425en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBargaining gamesen
dc.subject.keywordRaiffa solutionen
dc.subject.keywordNash solutionen
dc.subject.keywordAxiomatizationen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleAn axiomatization of the sequential Raiffa solution-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn622396234en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
206.66 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.