Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43768
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dc.contributor.authorTrockel, Walteren_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:22:22Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:22:22Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-16196en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43768-
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides four axioms that uniquely characterize the sequential Raiffa solution proposed by Raiffa (1951, 1953) for two-person bargaining games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several popular bargaining solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on TU-bargaining games where they coincide. The fourth axiom is a weakening of Kalai's (1977) axiom of step-by-step negotiating and turns out to be sort of a dual condition to a weaker version of Nash's IIA-axiom that together with the three standard axioms suffices to characterize the Nash bargaining solution due to Nash (1950). A conclusion of this axiomatization is that in contrast to all other known bargaining solutions the sequential Raiffa solution does not represent just another kind of fairness or equity condition in addition to the three standard axioms but rather is determined by indefinite repeated application of the three standard axioms.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW |cBielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics |x425en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBargaining gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordRaiffa solutionen_US
dc.subject.keywordNash solutionen_US
dc.subject.keywordAxiomatizationen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleAn axiomatization of the sequential Raiffa solutionen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn622396234en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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