Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43767 
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dc.contributor.authorHaake, Claus-Jochenen
dc.contributor.authorKlaus, Bettinaen
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-24-
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:22:20Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:22:20Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7662en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43767-
dc.description.abstractWe consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable (Theorems 1 and 3). Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theorem 2). In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefelden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x372en
dc.subject.jelC62en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.jelJ41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMatching with Contractsen
dc.subject.keyword(Maskin) Monotonicityen
dc.subject.keywordNash implementationen
dc.subject.keywordStabilityen
dc.subject.stwPersonalbeschaffungen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsvertragen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichtstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleMonotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn572501404en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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