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Title:On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games PDF Logo
Authors:Sung, Shao Chin
Dimitrov, Dinko
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 374
Abstract:We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players' preferences are additive.
Subjects:Additivity
Coalition formation
Core
Co-NP completeness
Hedonic games
JEL:C71
C63
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-8206
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University

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