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Title:Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag? PDF Logo
Authors:Dimitrov, Dinko
Haake, Claus-Jochen
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 375
Abstract:We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions for hedonic games we prove that the 'most' stable government is formed by the Union Parties together with the Social Democratic Party.
Subjects:Coalition formation
Shapley value
Simple games
Winning coalitions
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-8217
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University

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