Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43758
Authors: 
Koch, Lars P.
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 402
Abstract: 
We analyse finite two player games in which agents maximize given arbitrary private payoffs which we call ideologies. We define an equilibrium concept and prove existence. Based on this setup, a monotone evolutionary dynamic governs the distribution of ideologies within the population. For any finite 2 player normal form game we show that there is an open set of ideologies being not equivalent to the objective payoffs that is not selected against by evolutionary monotonic dynamics. If the game has a strict equilibrium set, we show stability of non-equivalent ideologies. We illustrate these results for generic 2 × 2-games.
Subjects: 
Dynamic stability
Evolution of preferences
Imitation dynamics
JEL: 
C72
C73
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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