|
EconStor >
Universität Bielefeld >
Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Universität Bielefeld >
Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43758
|
| | |
| Title: | | Persistent ideologies in an evolutionary setting  |
| Authors: | | Koch, Lars P. |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 402 |
| Abstract: | | We analyse finite two player games in which agents maximize given arbitrary private payoffs which we call ideologies. We define an equilibrium concept and prove existence. Based on this setup, a monotone evolutionary dynamic governs the distribution of ideologies within the population. For any finite 2 player normal form game we show that there is an open set of ideologies being not equivalent to the objective payoffs that is not selected against by evolutionary monotonic dynamics. If the game has a strict equilibrium set, we show stability of non-equivalent ideologies. We illustrate these results for generic 2 × 2-games. |
| Subjects: | | Dynamic stability Evolution of preferences Imitation dynamics |
| JEL: | | C72 C73 D82 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13865 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43758
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|