Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43757 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers No. 436
Publisher: 
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Abstract: 
This paper considers a two-player game with a one-dimensional continuous strategy. We study the asymptotic stability of equilibria under the replicator dynamic when the support of the initial population is an interval. We find that, under strategic complementarities, Continuously Stable Strategy (CSS) have the desired convergence properties using an iterated dominance argument. For general games, however, CSS can be unstable even for populations that have a continuous support. We present a sufficient condition for convergence based on elimination of iteratively dominated strategies. This condition is more restrictive than CSS in general but equivalent in the case of strategic complementarities. Finally, we offer several economic applications of our results.
Subjects: 
Continuously Stable Strategy (CSS)
Evolutionary stability
JEL: 
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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