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Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik, Universität Freiburg >

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dc.contributor.authorPelikan, Pavelen_US
dc.description.abstractAs governments lack the rationality-promoting selective pressures of market competition, the standard (unbounded) rationality assumption is less legitimate in Public Choice than in analysis of markets. This paper argues that many Public Choice problems require recognizing that human rationality has bounds, that these differ across individuals, and that rationality must therefore be treated as a special scarce resource, tied to individuals and used for deciding on its own uses. This complicates resource-allocation in society, which has to rely on institutionally shaped selection processes. But this also appears to be the only way to produce the long-missing analytical support to the first head of J.S. Mill's criticism of government, of which Public Choice has so far supported only the second.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFreiburg discussion papers on constitutional economics 07/2en_US
dc.subject.keywordunequally bounded rationalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordgovernment policiesen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choice , Beschränkte Rationalität , Theorieen_US
dc.titlePublic Choice with Unequally Rational Individualsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik, Universität Freiburg

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