Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43713
Authors: 
Libman, Alexander
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper series // Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 154
Abstract: 
The absence or the presence of the resource curse is often explained by the specifics of political and institutional factors. The aim of this paper is to study this effect looking separately at economic and political institutions and at their interaction. Unlike most empirical papers in the literature, this paper considers the intra-national variation of institutional environment and access to political decision-making, using a dataset of the Russian regions. It shows that subnational variation of the quality of institutions indeed matters for the effects of resources. Economic institutions follow the traditional 'resource curse' results: resources have a negative impact on growth if the quality of institutions is low. On the other hand, increasing level of democracy has negative consequences for regions with substantial resources. Finally, this paper studies the differentiation between the resource-extracting regions and regions, exporting, but not extracting resources, in terms of the conditional resource curse.
Subjects: 
subnational variation
conditional resource curse
democracy
economic institutions
transition economies
JEL: 
O13
P28
Q48
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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