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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43667
  

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dc.contributor.authorDewenter, Ralfen_US
dc.contributor.authorHaucap, Justusen_US
dc.contributor.authorWenzel, Tobiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-05T10:59:24Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-05T10:59:24Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-010-9en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43667-
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the effects that collusion can have in newspaper markets where firms compete for advertising as well as for readership. We compare three modes of competition: i) competition in the advertising and the reader market, ii) semi-collusion over advertising (with competition in the reader market), and iii) (full) collusion in both the advertising and the reader market. We find that semi-collusion leads to less advertising (but higher advertising prices) and lower copy prices which is beneficial for readers. Under certain circumstances, semi-collusion may even benefit advertisers as newspaper circulation is higher. In addition, total welfare may rise due to semi-collusion. Results under full collusion are ambiguous. However, even under full collusion newspaper copy prices may decrease and welfare may increase.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE discussion paper 11en_US
dc.subject.jelL40en_US
dc.subject.jelL82en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelK21en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMedia Marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordCollusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordTwo-Sided Marketsen_US
dc.subject.stwZeitungen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen_US
dc.subject.stwMedienökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSemi-collusion in media marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640630219en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:11-
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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