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Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf >
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf >
DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43667
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Dewenter, Ralf | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Haucap, Justus | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Wenzel, Tobias | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-11-26 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-01-05T10:59:24Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-01-05T10:59:24Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.isbn | | 978-3-86304-010-9 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43667 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper explores the effects that collusion can have in newspaper markets where firms compete for advertising as well as for readership. We compare three modes of competition: i) competition in the advertising and the reader market, ii) semi-collusion over advertising (with competition in the reader market), and iii) (full) collusion in both the advertising and the reader market. We find that semi-collusion leads to less advertising (but higher advertising prices) and lower copy prices which is beneficial for readers. Under certain circumstances, semi-collusion may even benefit advertisers as newspaper circulation is higher. In addition, total welfare may rise due to semi-collusion. Results under full collusion are ambiguous. However, even under full collusion newspaper copy prices may decrease and welfare may increase. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | DICE Düsseldorf | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | DICE discussion paper 11 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L40 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D43 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | K21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Media Markets | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Collusion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Two-Sided Markets | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Zeitung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Medienökonomik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wohlfahrtseffekt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Semi-collusion in media markets | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 640630219 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:dicedp:11 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
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