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Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf >
DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43667
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| Title: | | Semi-collusion in media markets  |
| Authors: | | Dewenter, Ralf Haucap, Justus Wenzel, Tobias |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | DICE discussion paper 11 |
| Abstract: | | This paper explores the effects that collusion can have in newspaper markets where firms compete for advertising as well as for readership. We compare three modes of competition: i) competition in the advertising and the reader market, ii) semi-collusion over advertising (with competition in the reader market), and iii) (full) collusion in both the advertising and the reader market. We find that semi-collusion leads to less advertising (but higher advertising prices) and lower copy prices which is beneficial for readers. Under certain circumstances, semi-collusion may even benefit advertisers as newspaper circulation is higher. In addition, total welfare may rise due to semi-collusion. Results under full collusion are ambiguous. However, even under full collusion newspaper copy prices may decrease and welfare may increase. |
| Subjects: | | Media Markets Collusion Two-Sided Markets |
| JEL: | | L40 L82 D43 K21 |
| ISBN: | | 978-3-86304-010-9 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
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