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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43667
  
Title:Semi-collusion in media markets PDF Logo
Authors:Dewenter, Ralf
Haucap, Justus
Wenzel, Tobias
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:DICE discussion paper 11
Abstract:This paper explores the effects that collusion can have in newspaper markets where firms compete for advertising as well as for readership. We compare three modes of competition: i) competition in the advertising and the reader market, ii) semi-collusion over advertising (with competition in the reader market), and iii) (full) collusion in both the advertising and the reader market. We find that semi-collusion leads to less advertising (but higher advertising prices) and lower copy prices which is beneficial for readers. Under certain circumstances, semi-collusion may even benefit advertisers as newspaper circulation is higher. In addition, total welfare may rise due to semi-collusion. Results under full collusion are ambiguous. However, even under full collusion newspaper copy prices may decrease and welfare may increase.
Subjects:Media Markets
Collusion
Two-Sided Markets
JEL:L40
L82
D43
K21
ISBN:978-3-86304-010-9
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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