Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43575 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 2010,60
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
We build a simple model of legal dualism in which a pro-poor legal reform, under certain conditions, causes the conflicting custom to go some way toward producing the change intended by the legislator. It then acts as an 'outside anchor' that exerts a 'magnet effect' on the custom. We illustrate this insight using examples on inheritance, marriage, and divorce issues in Sub-Saharan Africa and India. We also characterize the conditions under which a moderate pro-poor reform is more effective than a radical reform.
Subjects: 
Custom
Statutory Law
Inequality
Legal Reform
JEL: 
K40
O17
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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