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Title:The public management of risk: separating ex ante and ex post monitors PDF Logo
Authors:Hiriart, Yolande
Martimort, David
Pouyet, Jerome
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets 2010,144
Abstract:When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take the form of both monetary incentives but also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the optimal scope of monitoring depending on whether public monitors are benevolent or corruptible. We show that separating the ex ante and the ex post monitors increases the likelihood of ex post investigation, helps prevent capture and improves welfare.
Subjects:Risk Regulation
Monitoring
Capture
Integration
Separation
JEL:L51
D82
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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