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dc.contributor.authorCambini, Carloen_US
dc.contributor.authorRondi, Lauraen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:43:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:43:48Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43542-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the investment and financial decisions of a sample of 92 EU regulated utilities, taking into account key institutional features of EU public utilities, such as: a) regulation by agencies with various degrees of independence; b) partial ownership of the state in the regulated firm; and c) the government's political orientation, which may ultimately influence the regulatory climate to be either more pro-firm or more pro-consumers. Our results show that regulatory independence matters for both investment and financial decisions. Investment increases under an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA), while ownership has no effect. Leverage also increases when the IRA is in place, especially so if the regulated firm is privately controlled. Finally political orientation does matter, as firm investment increases under more conservative (pro-firm) governments, but this effect appears to revert when the IRA is in place.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets 2010,69en_US
dc.subject.jelG31en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.jelL33en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelL90en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRegulated Utilitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordInvestmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordCapital Structureen_US
dc.subject.keywordPrivate and State Ownershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordRegulatory Independenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordGovernment's Political Orientationen_US
dc.titleRegulatory independence and political interference: evidence from EU mixed-ownership utilities' investment and debten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640487610en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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