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dc.contributor.authorBjorvatn, Kjetilen_US
dc.contributor.authorNaghavi, Alirezaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:43:44Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:43:44Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43538-
dc.description.abstractAre natural resources a source of conflict or stability? Empirical studies demonstrate that rents from natural resources, and in particular oil, are an important source of civil war. Allegedly, resource rents attract rent seekers, which destabilize society. However, there is a large literature on how so-called rentier states manage to pacify opposition groups by handing out special favors. The present paper attempts to bridge the gap between the rent-seeking view of resource rents as a source of conflict and the rentier state view which emphasizes the role of resource rents in promoting peace and stability, and show how one may lead to the other. The mechanism that we highlight relies on the notion that higher rents may activate more interest groups in a power struggle. We demonstrate that the associated increased cost of conflict may in fact promote social stability. The peaceful solution is upheld by a self reinforcing transfer program, in the form of patronage employment. The chance of conflict and rent dissipation in our model is highest for intermediate levels of resource rents, where the government cannot make credible commitments to the opposition groups.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Global challenges 2010,39en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelQ34en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.keywordRentier Statesen_US
dc.subject.keywordResource Rentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordConflicten_US
dc.subject.keywordPatronage Employmenten_US
dc.titleRent seekers in rentier states: when greed brings peaceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640345859en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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