Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43526
Authors: 
Montero, Maria
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 2010,123
Abstract: 
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of majoritarian bargaining and shows that the paradox is predicted in equilibrium for past EU enlargements. Furthermore, a majority of members would have been in favor of the 1981 enlargement even if members were bargaining over a fixed budget.
Subjects: 
Majoritarian Bargaining
Weighted Voting
Power Measures
EU Enlargement
Paradox of New Members
JEL: 
C71
C72
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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