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FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43525
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| Title: | | Spying in multi-market oligopolies  |
| Authors: | | Billand, Pascal Bravard, Christophe Chakrabarti, Subhadip Sarangi, Sudipta |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 2010,117 |
| Abstract: | | We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We find that in some situations firms may refrain from spying even if it is costless. Moreover, even though spying leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental to both consumer welfare and social welfare. |
| Subjects: | | Oligopoly Multimarket Networks |
| JEL: | | C70 L13 L20 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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