Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43524 
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dc.contributor.authorLazarova, Emiliyaen
dc.contributor.authorDimitrov, Dinkoen
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-01-
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:43:30Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:43:30Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43524-
dc.description.abstractWe study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In this setting, we characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x2010,122en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelJ41en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCoalitionsen
dc.subject.keywordCoreen
dc.subject.keywordStabilityen
dc.subject.keywordStatus-seekingen
dc.titleStatus-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640803148en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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