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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43512
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| Title: | | 'Thou shalt not covet ...': prohibitions, temptation and moral values  |
| Authors: | | Cervellati, Matteo Vanin, Paolo |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Global challenges 2010,54 |
| Abstract: | | We propose a theory studying temptation in presence of both externally and internally sanctioned prohibitions. Moral values that (internally) sanction prohibited actions and their desire may increase utility by reducing self-control costs, thereby serving as partial commitment devices. We apply the model to crime and study the conditions under which agents would optimally adhere to moral values of honesty. Incentives to be moral are non- monotonic in the crime premium. Larger external punishments increase temptation and demand for morality, so that external and internal sanctions are complements. The model helps rationalizing stylized facts that proved difficult to explain with available theories. |
| Subjects: | | Prohibitions Temptation Self-Control Moral Values Crime |
| JEL: | | D03 K42 Z13 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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