Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43507
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dc.contributor.authorMondello, Gérarden_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:43:13Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:43:13Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43507-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy regulated by strict liability schemes. Strict liability induces judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for safety and the agent's level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard strict liability one because it induces the efficient agent to supply the level of safety effort equivalent to the first best solution. The counterpart is the perception of an informational rent by the efficient agent. At the optimum, this rent is minimized by the efficient contract supplied by the principal.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development |x2010,103en_US
dc.subject.jelK0en_US
dc.subject.jelK32en_US
dc.subject.jelQ01en_US
dc.subject.jelQ58en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEnvironmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordStrict Liabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordEx-Ante Regulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordEx-Post Liabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordJudgment-Proofen_US
dc.subject.keywordEnvironment Lawen_US
dc.subject.keywordCERCLAen_US
dc.subject.keywordEnvironmental Liabilityen_US
dc.titleRisky activities and strict liability rules: delegating safeen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640615732en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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