Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43494 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 2010,120
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors' behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game's history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough. All equilibria under exogenously imposed truth-telling extend to strategic communication, and additional ones arise due to richer communication. There are equilibria in which a player lies. The flow of information is related with network centrality measures.
Schlagwörter: 
Repeated Game
Prisoner's Dilemma
Imperfect Private Monitoring
Network
Strategic Communication
Centrality
JEL: 
C72
C73
D85
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
297.14 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.