Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43470
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dc.contributor.authorIkefuji, Masakoen_US
dc.contributor.authorItaya, Jun-ichien_US
dc.contributor.authorOkamura, Makotoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:42:34Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:42:34Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43470-
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores optimal environmental tax policy under which duopoly firms strategically choose the location of their plants in a simple three-stage game. We examine how the relationship between the optimal emission tax and the choice of location of duopoly firms affects the welfare of the home country. We characterize the relationship between the optimal emission tax and the fixed cost, depending on the degree of environmental damage from production. Finally, we show the existence of asymmetric equilibrium in which either firm chooses relocation of its plant even if the duopoly firms are identical ex ante.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable Development |x2010,6en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEnvironmental policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordRelocationen_US
dc.subject.keywordWelfareen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Standortwahlen_US
dc.subject.stwDuopolen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOptimal emission tax with endogenous location choice of duopolistic firmsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640183476en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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