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dc.contributor.authorTavoni, Alessandroen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchlüter, Majaen_US
dc.contributor.authorLevin, Simonen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.en_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 2010,127en_US
dc.subject.keywordSocial Normen_US
dc.subject.keywordCommon Pool Resourceen_US
dc.subject.keywordEvolutionary Game Theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordReplicator Equationen_US
dc.subject.keywordAgent-based Simulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordCoupled Socio-resource Dynamicsen_US
dc.titleThe survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource managementen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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