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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Mailand >
FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43451
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Tavoni, Alessandro | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Schlüter, Maja | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Levin, Simon | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-12-22T10:42:12Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-12-22T10:42:12Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43451 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milano | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 2010,127 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q20 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D70 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Cooperation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Social Norm | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Ostracism | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Common Pool Resource | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Evolutionary Game Theory | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Replicator Equation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Agent-based Simulation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Coupled Socio-resource Dynamics | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 64118221X | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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