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Title:The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management PDF Logo
Authors:Tavoni, Alessandro
Schlüter, Maja
Levin, Simon
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 2010,127
Abstract:This paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.
Subjects:Cooperation
Social Norm
Ostracism
Common Pool Resource
Evolutionary Game Theory
Replicator Equation
Agent-based Simulation
Coupled Socio-resource Dynamics
JEL:C73
Q20
D70
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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