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dc.contributor.authorKossioris, Georgiosen_US
dc.contributor.authorPlexousakis, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.authorXepapadeas, Anastasiosen_US
dc.contributor.authorde Zeeuw, Aarten_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:42:04Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:42:04Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43444-
dc.description.abstractRecent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state- dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 2010,101en_US
dc.subject.jelQ25en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelC61en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDifferential Gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordnon-linear Feedback Nash Equilibriaen_US
dc.subject.keywordEcosystemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordOptimal State-dependent Taxen_US
dc.titleOn the optimal taxation of common-pool resourcesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn64061485Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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