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Title:On the optimal taxation of common-pool resources PDF Logo
Authors:Kossioris, Georgios
Plexousakis, Michael
Xepapadeas, Anastasios
de Zeeuw, Aart
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 2010,101
Abstract:Recent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state- dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes.
Subjects:Differential Games
non-linear Feedback Nash Equilibria
Ecosystems
Optimal State-dependent Tax
JEL:Q25
C73
C61
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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